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Federal Income T ~ X ~ ~ ~ O ~ - I N V E STAX
T MCREDIT-EXCLUSION
ENT
OF "BUILDINGS"
FROM THE INVESTMENT
TAXC R E D I T - T ~ ~V.~ U ~
Commissioner, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974).
In 1966 the appellants, Arne and Pauline Thirup, spent approximately $80,000 to construct a new greenhouse1 and replace
the siding and roofing on existing greenhouses. On their 1966
federal income tax returns, the Thirups claimed an investment
tax credit under section 38 of the Internal Revenue Code for the
full amount expended. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
disallowed the investment credit on the ground that the greenhouses were "buildings" within t h e meaning of section
48(a)(l)(B) and therefore not eligible for the credit. The United
States Tax Court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner,
holding that the greenhouses were buildings in appearance and
f ~ n c t i o nThe
. ~ United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the greenhouses did not function as
buildings and therefore were not excluded from the provisions of
the investment tax credit.

Sections 38 and 46-50 of the Internal Revenue Code provide
for a percentage tax credit on the dollar amount of investment in
certain depreciable business property having a useful life of three
years or more. Originally called the "investment tax credit," the
credit is now officially known as the "job development investment red it."^ The history of the credit has been stormy. First
enacted by Congress in 1962,4 the credit was suspended from
October 19665to March 19678and was terminated in April 1969.'
Congress restored the credit as part of the Revenue Act of 1971.8
-

1. There was some objection in the Tax Court to the use of the term "greenhouses."
In addition to consisting of two words, one of which clearly implies a building, the word
is so broad as to include structures that are substantially different from the appellants'.
Record at 6-8, Arne Thirup, 59 T.C. 122 (1972), rev'd, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974).
However, as was done in the Tax Court and the court of appeals, this case note will, for
simplicity's sake, refer to these structures as greenhouses.
2. Arne Thirup, 59 T.C. 122 (1972), reo'd, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974).
3. H.R. REP.NO. 92-533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971).
4. Act of Oct. 16, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, $2, 76 Stat. 962.
5. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, $1, 80 Stat. 1508.
6. Act of June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Stat. 57.
7. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, tit. VII, $703, 83 Stat. 660.
8. Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. I, $101, 85 Stat. 498.
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A.

T h e Origin of t h e "Building" Exception

One feature of the investment tax credit that has remained
constant throughout its existence is the exclusion of "a building
and its structural components" from the provisions of the credit.
Section 48(a)9defines the types of property eligible for the investment tax credit (known as "section 38 property") as follows:
a. SECTION 38 PROPERTY .(a) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in this subsection, the term "section 38 property" means(A) tangible personal property, or
(B) other tangible property (not including a
building and its structural components) . . . .10

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, exercising congressional authority to promulgate regulations implementing the provisions of the credit," has defined "building" as follows:
The term "building" generally means any structure or edifice
enclosing a space within its walls, and usually covered by a roof,
the purpose of which is, for example, to provide shelter or housing, or to provide working, office, parking, display, or sales
space. The term includes, for example, structures such as apartment houses, factory and office buildings, warehouses, barns,
garages, railway or bus stations, and stores. . . . Such term
does not include (i) a structure which is essentially an item of
machinery or equipment, or (ii) a structure which houses property used as an integral part of an activity specified in section
48(a)(l)(B)(i)if the use of the structure is so closely related to
the use of such property that the structure clearly can be expected to be replaced when the property it initially houses is
replaced. l 2
9. All references in the text to "section" or "sections," unless otherwise indicated,
refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended.
10. INT.REV.CODEOF 1954, $48(a) (emphasis added). Other tangible property qualifies as "section 38 property" only if i t provides one of the following operations:
(i) is used as an integral part of manufacturing, production, or extraction
or of furnishing transportation, communications, electrical energy, gas, water,
or sewage disposal services, or
(ii) constitutes a research facility used in connection with any of the activities referred to in clause (i), or
(iii) constitutes a facility used in connection with any of the activities
referred to in clause (i) for the bulk storage of fungible commodities (including
commodities in a liquid or gaseous state) . . . .
INT.REV.CODEOF 1954, $48(a)(l)(B).
11. INT.REV.CODEOF 1954, $38(b).
12. Treas. Reg. $1.48-l(e)(l) (1972). The language from the committee reports is
similar.
The term "building" is to be given its commonly accepted meaning, that
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In spite of the Commissioner's attempt to clarify the meaning of
"building," the term has been the cause of much litigation and
confusion. Perhaps the controversy surrounding the meaning of
"building" is due to the uncertain circumstances under which the
exception for buildings was born.
President Kennedy introduced the investment tax credit to
Congress in a special taxation message in early 1961. He said:
Specifically, therefore, I recommend enactment of an investment tax incentive in the form of a tax credit ofFifteen percent of all new plant [this term includes
buildings] and equipment investment expenditures in
excess of current depreciation allowances . . . .13

In the same message, Kennedy proposed the elimination of capital gains treatment on the sale of essentially all depreciable business property (buildings and equipment). This was to be accomplished through the depreciation recapture provisions of what is
now section 1245.14
When the President's tax proposals were sent to the House
Ways and Means Committee for hearings, they received a cold
reception. Labor and business both criticized the investment tax
credit.I5 Real estate interests charged that the application of the
depreciation recapture provisions to realty would damage the real
the public hearings were over, Ways and
estate busine~s.~Wfter
Means Committee members met with Treasury officials in
closed-door hearings to develop an acceptable compromise.17The
resulting compromise bill applied the credit only to new investment in equipment-buildings were left out.18It should be noted
that the committee decided to exclude buildings from the tax
is, a structure or edifice enclosing a space within its walls, and usually covered
by a roof. It is the basic structure of an improvement to land the purpose of
which is, for example, to provide shelter or housing or to provide working, office,
display, or sales space. The term would include, for example, the basic structure
used as a factory, office building, warehouse, theater, railway or bus station,
gymnasium, or clubhouse.
H.R. REP. NO. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. A18 (1962) (Technical Explanation of the Bill);
S. REP. NO. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 154-55 (1962).
13. Hearings on the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations Before the Comm. on
Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings].
14. Id. a t 13.
15. Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1961, a t 2, col. 3; id., May 9, 1961, a t 5, col. 2; id.,
May 16, 1961, a t 2, col. 2; id., May 17, 1961, a t 3, col. 4; id., May 19, 1961, at 12, col. 1.
16. Id., May 10, 1961, a t 1, col. 5; id., May 16, 1961, a t 2, col. 2.
17. Id., June 12, 1961, a t 1, col. 6.
18. Id., July 18, 1961, a t 3, col. 1.
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credit only after it had announced that buildings would be excluded from depreciation recapture. lg
Although the exact reasons for excluding buildings from the
tax credit are not known, the following appear to have been major
factors: (1)many, principally labor and business, opposed the tax
credit;20(2) real estate interests strongly opposed depreciation
recapture as applied to realty;21(3) the Administration seemed to
be more concerned with equipment investment than building investment;22and (4) the House Ways and Means Committee was
concerned about the expected revenue loss from the credit.23The
elimination of buildings from both the investment tax credit and
the depreciation recapture provisions constituted a compromise
solution. Once the proposals became law, however, confusion surrounding the building exception emerged.

B. Judicial Interpretations of "Building"
In order to determine whether or not a structure is a building,
the courts have developed a dual test: first, does the structure
look like a building and, second, does it function as a building?24
This appearance-functional test derives from the following language in the Treasury regulations:
The term "building" generally means any structure or edifice
enclosing a space within its walls, and usually covered by a roof
[appearance], the purpose of which is, for example, to provide
shelter or housing, or to provide working, office, parking, display, or sales space [function] .25

The trend in the courts is to stress the function of a structure
more than the appearance. In applying the functional test, however, the courts have not developed a consistent approach; rather,
they have used varying criteria.
19. Glasman, Investment Credit-One Year Later, 1964 TUL.TAXINST. 385, 421.
20. See note 15 supra.
21. See note 16 supra. President Kennedy specifically intended that the revenue loss
from the tax credit would be partially offset by the depreciation recapture provisions. 1961
Hearings 20, 44 (Statement of C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury); 3 B.C. IND.
& COM.L. REV.232, 239-40 (1962).
22. See 1961 Hearings 20, 390 (Statement of C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the
Treasury).
23. Glasman, supra note 19, a t 421.
24. While most courts do make reference to the physical appearance of a structure,
i t is not always clear how the appearance test is used. Most structures litigated under the
investment tax credit look like buildings; therefore, the courts do not explicitly discuss
the appearance test. In these cases the courts use that test as a threshold determination
but focus on the functional test.
25. Treas. Reg. $1.48-l(e)(l) (1972).
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Recent court decisions illustrate the application of the
appearance-functional test. In Robert E. Catron," petitioner
built a metal Quonset-type structure for the sorting and storage
of apples. The court held that the one-third of the structure which
served exclusively as cold storage qualified as section 38 prope r t ~ . ~In' spite of the structure's appearance as a building, the
court emphasized its function: the lack of employee working
space determined that the cold storage part did not function as a
building. In Adolph Coors Co. ,28two beer cellars and four barley
receiving stations qualified as section 38 property. The court followed a functional approach and made no mention of the appearance test. The lack of employee activity taking place in the structures, coupled with the fact that the structures were not useful
for other purposes, was d e t e r m i n a t i ~ e . ~ ~
case to Arne Thirup,
In Sunnyside N u r ~ e r i e sa, ~companion
~
the Tax Court held that the taxpayer's greenhouses were buildings in appearance and function.31Although this holding was the
same as that in Arne Thirup, the two cases were factually different in several respects. In contrast to the Thirups' greenhouses,
the Sunnyside greenhouses had concrete floors and foundations
and were made of steel frame and aluminum bar construction.
Also, Sunnyside's employees performed substantially more work
in the greenhouses than did the Thirups' employees.
Subsequent to Sunnyside and Thirup, the Tax Court, in
Melvin S a t r ~ mheld
, ~ ~that egg-producing facilities qualified as
section 38 property. In stressing the functional test, the court
distinguished the case from Sunnyside and Thirup by noting a
more limited amount of employee activity in the egg-producing
facilities. In another recent case also stressing the functional test,
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States,33the Court of
Claims held that six whiskey maturation facilities were not buildings for purposes of the credit. The court emphasized three factors in coming to this conclusion: (1)the facilities' lack of working
space; (2) the limited utility of the structures for any other pur26. 50 T.C. 306 (1968).
27. Id. at 315.
28. 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1351 (1968),appeal dismissed per stipulation, CCH 1975
FED. TAXCITATOR
?90,599 (10th Cir. 1969).
29. Id. at 1362.
30. 59 T.C. 113 (1972).
31. Id. at 119.
32. 62 T.C. 413 (1974), appeal dismissed, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES761,006 (9th Cir.
Sept. 29, 1975).
33. 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. C1. 1974).
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pose; and (3) the fact that the working space provided in the
structures was only incidental to the structures' principal purpose. The court said that the third factor was the main criterion.
Prior to the instant case, then, courts used different criteria
in applying the functional test. While a t times emphasizing or
relying on a particular factor, the courts never explicitly rejected
the validity of any one factor.

In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals followed the majority of recent cases by stressing the importance of
the functional test. In so doing, however, the court rejected outright the appearance test, reasoning that the test is too imprecise
to achieve the congressional purpose of encouraging improvements in the quality and quantity of American industrial products. Referring to Melvin Satrum3*and B r o w n - F ~ r m a n the
,~~
court stated that "the most recent authorities have adopted the
functional test" and abandoned the appearance test. The court
indicated that its purely functional approach eliminates from the
tax credit the general purpose building that Congress intended to
eliminate and includes those buildings that are specifically
adapted for p r o d u c t i ~ n . ~ ~
In applying the functional test, the court refused to consider
the amount of employee activity, the primary consideration in
Melvin Satrum and Brown-Forman, reasoning that the nature of
employee activity is determinative. If the predominant purpose
of the structure is to provide working space and shelter for the
employees, the structure functions as a building; but, in contrast,
if the structure serves as a productive facility so that the employees' activities therein are only supportive or ancillary to the productive purpose of the structure, the structure qualifies for the
investment credit. In the instant case, the employee working
space in the greenhouses was only incidental to the purpose of the
structures which was to provide a total environment to aid in the
growing of flowers. Employee activities were only supportive of
that purpose. The greenhouses, therefore, were not buildings and
were thus eligible for the investment tax credit.37
34.
35.
36.
37.

62 T.C. 413 (1974).
499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. C1. 1974).
508 F.2d at 919.
Id. at 919-20.
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In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit asserted that a structure's function is the sole test of whether the structure is a building. The court did not discuss, however, whether its purely functional approach would apply if the structure in question functioned as a building but did not have the appearance or physical
characteristics of one. It is important, therefore, to determine if
the court was correct in rejecting the appearance test altogether
and adopting the functional test as the sole criterion. In addition,
it is appropriate to examine the legislative history of the "building" exception to see if the court's approach adequately effectuates congressional intent.
A.

Rejection of the Appearance Test

The court justified its rejection of the appearance test on
three grounds: (1) the congressional purpose "to encourage improvements in the quality and quantity of American industrial
products" would not be served by using the test; (2) recent decisions of other courts have rejected the appearance test; and (3)
recent decisions of the Internal Revenue Service have declined to
apply the test.38Analysis of these three grounds, however, demonstrates the questionable nature of the court's rationale.
The court admitted that the appearance test has support in
the regulation^^^ and committee reports,40yet rejected the test as
"too imprecise" to effect the congressional purpose of encourag.~~
ing more and better p r o d u ~ t i o n Without
doubt, the overall
objective of the credit is to encourage industry to invest in new
capital improvements. Nevertheless, the "building" restriction
contained in the statutory scheme is evidence that Congress intended to encourage investment within definite limits. The
court's statement of congressional purpose, therefore, is not on
point, since the relevant inquiry concerning congressional intent
is not whether the appearance test encourages investment, but
whether this test helps to effectuate the congressional purpose in
excluding buildings from the investment tax credit.
The court cited two recent cases, B r o w n - F o r ~ n a nand
~~
Melvin S a t r ~ r nas~ support
~
for its rejeetion of the appearance
Id. at 918.
See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
See note 12 supra.
508 F.2d a t 918.
42. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
43. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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test. While the cases point out that the appearance test is not
always determinative, neither the holdings in the cases nor the
language of the opinions reject the appearance test as the court
did in the instant case. The Court of Claims in Brown-Forman
and the Tax Court in Melvin Satrum determined that the structures involved had the physical characteristics of buildings, but
held that the structures were not buildings because they did not
function as such. Although the result in these cases would have
been the same without the appearance test, there is no language
in either case indicating that the appearance test was rejected.
The Ninth Circuit also asserted that two revenue rulings44"declined . . . to apply the appearance test." Both rulings illustrate,
however, instances where the appearance test is merely given less
weight than the functional test; in neither ruling does the Internal
Revenue Service explicitly reject the appearance test?
The impropriety of rejecting altogether the appearance test
and relying exclusively on the functional test is suggested by the
recent Tax Court case of Joseph Henry Moore46which involved
the applicability of the investment tax credit to trailer houses.
The trailer houses did not qualify for the tax credit under section
48(a)(l)(B),since they did not provide one of the operations enumerated in t h a t p r o v i ~ i o n .The
~ ~ taxpayer, therefore, tried to
qualify them as "tangible personal property" under section
48(a) (l)(A). The government countered that they were buildings
and thus could not qualify as "tangible personal property." The
Tax Court responded in these terms:
The respondent [the Commissioner] urges that since trailers were used to provide shelter or housing, they are, by virtue
of their "functional use," no different from a building. Applying
this "functional use" test, the respondent concludes that the
trailers should not be treated as tangible personal property for
purposes of the investment credit.
The "functional use" test of the regulations (sec. 1.48-l(e))
has been applied by the Court in a differing factual context. . . . But we have never held, and the regulations do not
suggest, that "functional use" is the sole criterion by which an
item's status as a building is to be determined. Even the respon44. Rev. Rul. 132, 1968-1 CUM.BULL.14; Rev. Rul. 359, 1971-2 CUM.BULL.62.
45. The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue stated in one 1968 revenue ruling,
however, that "the definition of the term 'building' for investment credit purposes is
stated in terms of function rather than physcial appearance." Rev. Rul. 209, 1968-1CUM.
BULL.16.
46. 58 T.C. 1045 (1972), aff'd, 489 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1973).
47. See note 10 supra.
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dent admits that if a trailer is towed from place to place, it
would "probably" be personal property. Obviously, in that instance the trailer would also be used for shelter and housing and
would serve the function of a building. If "functional use" were
the sole standard by which to judge whether a trailer is a building, it should logically be of no importance whether it is towed
from town to town or towed from place to place in a trailer park.
It is apparent that before the "functional use" test can properly
be applied in this case, it must first be shown that the trailers
were permanent improvements to the land [i.e.,had the physical characteristics of a building]. As we indicated above, this
requirement is fully consistent with the respondent's own regulations and with congressional intent.48

Applying both the appearance and the functional test, the court
held that the house trailers qualified for the investment tax
credit.
While not dealing with the same subparagraph of section
48(a)(l) involved in the instant case, the Moore decision does
illustrate the problem that can arise from the exclusive application of the functional test: a structure that functions as a building
may be excluded from the investment tax credit regardless of its
physical characteristics. Such would be the result of a mechanical
application of the Thirup analysis to the facts of the Moore case.
In light of this possibility, the courts should not reject altogether
the appearance test, as did the Ninth Circuit. Application of that
test may be necessary in a future case to properly effectuate the
congressional purposes underlying the "buildings" exception and
the investment tax credit.

B. Adoption and Application of the Functional Test
The court's exclusive use of the functional test extends the
current judicial trend of giving the functional test greater weight
than the appearance test when determining whether a structure
is a building.49There is some inconsistency, however, among the
courts in applying the functional test. I t is not clear from judicial
decisions what factors should determine whether a structure
functions as a building. Among the criteria used by the courts in
evaluating the function of a structure are: the adaptability of the
structure to other purposes (the greater the adaptability of a
structure, the more it functions as a building);50the amount of
48. 58 T.C. a t 1052-53.
49. See notes 26-33 supra and accompanying text.
50. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 1283
(W.D. Ken. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
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employee activity taking place inside the structure (the greater
the activity that takes place, the more the structure provides
working space and ~ h e l t e r ) ;the
~ ' amount of working space inside
the structure (the regulations state that one of the purposes of a
"building" is to provide working space);52and the nature of employee activity (if the employee activity is only incidental to the
purpose of the structure, then the structure does not primarily
provide shelter or working space).53
The court in the instant case took a narrow approach in
applying the functional test by focusing entirely on one factor-the nature of the employees' activities. I t cited BrownForman5' and Robert E. CatronJ5as support for this a p p r ~ a c h . ~ '
An examination of those cases, however, shows that the courts did
not focus solely on the nature of employee activity; they also
scrutinized the amount of that activity. The Ninth Circuit's approach seems unnecessarily restrictive in contrast to the flexible
approaches taken by the other courts. A more reasonable approach in light of the court's emphasis on the flexible nature of
the functional test would be to look a t several factors, including
adaptability and amount of working space.
C.

The Court's Use of Congressional Intent

In rejecting the appearance test, the court indicated that the
test fails to effectuate the broad purpose of the tax credit?' In
adopting the functional test, however, the court did not look
solely to this broad purpose. It also focused on the narrow purpose
of the provision excluding buildings. The court asserted that the
functional test excludes from the tax credit the "general purpose
buildings" that Congress intended to exclude and includes "those
United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. C1.1974); Central Citrus Co., 58T.C. 365 (1972); Palmer
Olson, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1494 (1970); Adolph Coors Co., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1351
(1968).
51. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. C1.1974);
Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974); Sunnyside Nurseries, 59 T.C. 113 (1972); Adolph
Coors Co., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1351 (1968).
52. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 1283
(W.D. Ken. 1973); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct.
C1. 1974); Central Citrus Co., 58 T.C. 365 (1972); Sunnyside Nurseries, 59 T.C. 113 (1972);
Palmer Olson, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1494 (1970); Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968).
53. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 1283
(W.D. Ken. 1973); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct.
C1. 1974); Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974); Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968).
54. 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. C1. 1974).
55. 50 T.C. 306 (1968).
56. 508 F.2d a t 919.
57. See text acoompanying notes 39-41 supra.
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specialized structures whose utility is principally and primarily
a significantly contributive factor in the actual manufacturing or
production of the product itself."58As already noted, the court's
reliance on the broad objective was inappropriate in the context
of the present case.59The court's reference to the narrow congressional objective of excluding buildings from the credit was more
apposite. The court offered no support, however, for its version
of the congressional objective or purpose underlying the "buildings" exception.60
Of the four factors61that may have influenced the House
Ways and Means Committee in making the decision to drop
buildings from the provisions of depreciation recapture and the
investment tax credit, commentatorsSZindicate that the precipitating factor, if not the principal factor, was the pressure from
real estate interests that opposed depreciation recapture as applied to realty. The makeup of this special interest group was
obviously broad, as is evidenced by the list of parties appearing
before the House Ways and Means Committee in 1961,63yet these
parties had a common goal: maintenance of incentives to buy and
sell real estate. This goal was manifested by the real estate interests' opposition to the depreciation recapture ruled4 The Ways
and Means Committee, by excluding from depreciation recapture
(and the investment tax credit) the types of real property commonly bought and sold-land
and general purpose
buildings-satisfied the objectives of these real estate interests?
58. 508 F.2d a t 919.
59. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
60. 508 F.2d a t 919.
61. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text.
62. J. EUSTICE,
M. FERGUSON
& S. ROSS,FEDERAL
INCOME
TAXLEGISLATION
OF 196238-39 (1965); Glasman, supra note 19, a t 420-21.
1964 IN PERSPECTIVE
63. The list of real estate interests opposing depreciation recapture includes: National Association of Real Estate Boards, 1961 Hearings 1043; American Hotel Association, 1961 Hearings 1215; National Association of Home Builders, 1961 Hearings 1233;
National Retail Lumber Dealers Association, 1961 Hearings 1530; and Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater New York, 1961 Hearings 1549.
64. There was also some realtor opposition to the investment tax credit. See 1961
Hearings 1531 (testimony of representative of Associated General Contractors of America,
Inc.) . However, the real estate groups were principally concerned with depreciation recapture. See notes 16 & 63 supra.
65. See J . EUSTICE,
supra note 62, a t 38-39. One witness before the committee recommended that buildings should be excluded from the investment credit for reasons independent of depreciation recapture:
Buildings, by contrast [to equipment], are frequently owned by separate corporations or syndicates, and are bought, sold, and exchanged for tax advantages
rather than to secure properties which are inherently more productive from an
economic standpoint.
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But the compromise bill not only appeased the real estate interests; it also restricted the scope of the tax credit, a proposal
subject to widespread opposition, and thereby reduced the revenue loss from the credit. The compromise, however, left the heart
of the provision-equipment investment-intact. In eliminating
land and general purpose buildings, Congress left eligible for the
tax credit special purpose structures which function much as do
pieces of equipment necessary for a particular production process." With this distinction between "buildings" and productive
"non-buildings," Congress attempted to effectuate the overall
purpose of the investment tax credit: stimulation of production
in the United States.
The court's decision in the instant case, therefore, is consistent with the overall purpose of the tax credit and, more importantly, the probable motive for the "buildings" exception. The
Thirups' greenhouses were designed to directly facilitate a particular "production" process, to provide a total environment for the
production of flowers, and were only useful in that process. The
human activity that took place in the greenhouses was merely
incidental to the production of flowers. Further, it seems unlikely
that the greenhouses would be bought and sold as investments,
since their limited function makes them unattractive for investment purposes. As a general rule, real estate investors and builders are more interested in structures that can be used for various
Because of the differences in the reasons for sale and exchanges of real
estate, as compared to machinery and equipment, the denial of the proposed
investment credit to certain forms of buildings seems a sound one, which should
be adopted in any basic depreciation reform.
1961 Hearings 951, 955 (Statement of Dan Throop Smith, Professor of Finance, Harvard
Graduate School of Business Adminstration).
66. While working on the reinstatement of the tax credit in 1971, the Senate Committee on Finance attempted to clarify the meaning of "building." Although it failed to
relieve the confusion significantly, the Committee did give the following example of a
special purpose structure:
One example of a type of structure closely related to the product it houses
which was called to the attention of the committee is a unitary system for raising
hogs which includes automatic feed systems, special airflow units, slatted flooring, pens and partitions. The structure which can be added to, according to the
number of hogs raised, is no more than a cover and way of tying together the
specially designed pens, automatic feed systems, etc. There is no other practical
use for the structure and it can, therefore, be expected to be used only so long
as the equipment it houses is used. Such a structure would be eligible for an
investment credit.
S. REP. NO. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1971).
As note 10 indicates, there are several other operations besides production which a
structure can provide and still be eligible for the tax credit. This case note only refers to
production as that was the purpose of the greenhouses in the instant case.
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purposes and thus have wider marketability. In sum, the court's
distinction between "general purpose" and "special purpose"
structures accurately reflected the attempted congressional distinction between "buildings" and productive "non-buildings"
and thereby gave effect to the primary purpose of the investment
tax credit without expanding it beyond its intended scope.

